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ABSTRACT
ISU held the first Cyber Defense Competition (CDC) in the spring of 2005. Since then,
the number of competitions per year has grown, as well as the complexity of the competitions.
As cyber security becomes increasingly important to both the public and private sectors, other
higher learning institutions may wish to run their own CDCs. In order to support such efforts,
we are developing the CDC in a box. This project would provide software, tools, and support
to help other institutions run CDCs. As part of this effort, I identify short comings of the
current ISU CDCs and provide solutions along with results. In addition, the core tools and
software needed to create the CDC in a box are introduced, as well as the motivation behind
their creation.
1CHAPTER 1. OVERVIEW
As cybersecurity becomes a growing concern among both the private and public sectors, the
need for skilled computer security professionals has increased. The types of cybersecurity jobs
fall into several areas of focus. Two of the most common are: 1. Traditional defense in which
the professional protects systems and data from attack and misuse. 2. Penetration testing
where the professional attempts to defeat the system’s defenses. These jobs require skills that
allow the professional to understand how cyber attackers, or hackers, work. In other words,
they themselves need to know how to hack.
At Iowa State University (ISU), several cyber defense competitions (CDCs) are held each
year. These competitions allow students to set up computer systems and then defend them
against a group of hackers. These hackers are made up of professionals and more experienced
students. By participating as either a defender or an attacker, a student gains hands on
experience practicing cybersecurity.
There are four CDCs every year at ISU. The first is between teams of students at ISU.
Both undergraduate and graduate students can participate. The next is for community colleges
(C3DC) in the area. The third is the national competition (NCDC) where teams from other
universities as well as the top performers at the first and second CDCs participate. The fourth
is a part of the IT-Olympics event. These teams are made up of high school students. The
purpose of the CDCs is to help students of every skill level learn more about the IT field,
teamwork, and cybersecurity. As such, many of the students participate in the CDCs for fun
without any formal classwork or training.
As cybersecurity becomes increasingly common in higher learning curriculums, other higher
learning institutions may want to run their own cyber defense competitions to give their stu-
dents hands on practice. To support this, I have begun the development of the CDC in a box
2project. This will be an ongoing project at ISU that will provide both tools and guidance to
run CDCs.
1.1 Introduction
A successful CDC requires: people, logistics, hardware, and software. Each of these com-
ponents is equally important.
1.1.1 People
There are several groups of people at a CDC broken up into various teams: blue, white,
red, and green. There are also volunteers and spectators that aren’t part of any team.
1.1.1.1 Blue Teams
Blue teams are made up of the defenders. The blue teams compete against each other.
Scoring is determined to gauge their performance. At the end of the competition, the team
with the highest score wins. For some competitions, each blue team has an adviser. This
person assists the teams with logistics and his or her own knowledge, but is not allowed to help
the team during the competition.
1.1.1.2 White Team
White team members run the competition. They are essentially both the hosts and the
referees. A competition leader is chosen and he or she oversees the running of the competition
while delegating to the rest of the white team. The white team determines the schedule of events
and performs the scoring as well as acts as a judge for any disputes. The white team also awards
points to the blue teams based on how good their network and systems documentation is. They
also award points based on the blue teams’ reports submitted every two hours detailing how
their systems were attacked.
31.1.1.3 Red Team
Red team members act as hackers and attack the blue teams’ systems. If they break into
a blue team’s system and steal data, that team loses points. The data they steal are known as
flags. So, the goal of the red team is to play a game of capture the flag. They also attempt to
plant flags on the blue teams’ systems. This represents malicious changes that the attackers
could make to the system with their administrative access. They also award points to the blue
teams based on both their technical performance and their team spirit. A red team leader is
chosen who directs the rest of the team.
1.1.1.4 Green Team
Green team members act as users of the blue teams’ systems. They award points to the
blue teams based on how well their services work. A green team leader is chosen who directs
the rest of the team.
The green team leader assigns anomalies to the blue teams. These anomalies are used to
simulate real world events and requests. For example, adding/deleting/disabling users, setting
up new services, restoring files, or solving a problem.
The green team leader along with the green team score the user documentation provided to
them by the blue team. The documentation is scored for accuracy, completeness, professional-
ism, and ease of use.
1.1.1.5 Other People
Other volunteers usually help run the competition without being an official part of it. For
example, someone may staff and maintain a snack bar where participants can get refreshments.
In addition, there are commonly spectators who drop by and are curious about the competition.
It is common for them to walk around talking to the blue team members about their experience.
At ISU the spectators are welcome, but depending on the rules of a competition, they may not
be allowed to directly interact with the teams.
41.1.2 Logistics
A CDC requires substantial planning and preparation from all involved, especially the white
team. A venue must be chosen that is large enough and can support all the necessary computer
hardware. Dates and schedules need to be decided ahead of time. The way teams prepare their
systems for the competition as well as to how to get those systems to the competition must be
decided.
1.1.3 Software
For the competition systems, any operating system or software can be used as long as
it is allowed by the competition rules. In general, ISU allows free, trial, and ISU provided
software. The white team systems provide the core of the competition network through an
ISEBox system. ISEBox is a single physical server running several virtual machines each
running ISEFlow. ISEBox creates a virtual internet that is used for the competition network.
Additional systems are used by the white team to run the competition, including: an e-mail
server, a web server, a scoring server, several proxy servers, and a DNS server.
1.1.4 Hardware
The needs of each CDC may vary. However, in general computers are needed for everyone
involved. These systems need not be powerful as they are simply for letting each member
interact with the competition systems. It is common to require each person participating to
bring a laptop.
The hardware necessary to run the competition systems is more substantial. Generally
server class systems are needed for each blue team. In lieu of one powerful system, blue teams
may use several less powerful systems. The white team also needs to have at least one server
class system to run ISEBox as well as some support systems.
Networking hardware is also needed. Wireless is generally not used, so ethernet switches
are needed to connect everyone to the competition network. In addition, this may require long
network cable runs.
51.1.5 A typical ISU CDC
Several months before the competition is to begin, potential participants are asked to reg-
ister blue teams for the event. About one month before the competition, the white team sends
the rules, scenario, and set up information to all registered blue teams. Volunteers build sev-
eral vulnerable systems to be given to each blue team. These systems may have both common
administrative mistakes, such as running a service as an administrative user, or may contain
backdoors or other malicious programs left by hackers after a system compromise. The blue
teams then remotely access the systems they are given. In addition, they are allowed to create
a few systems completely from scratch. Sometimes the choice of operating system and software
is given to the blue team. Other times it is specified in the scenario.
Blue teams have free reign to set up their network topology as they please. Many choose
to put a firewall in front of their systems. In addition, blue teams may set up extra systems
and services not required by the scenario. However, each team is given limited resources which
may make it challenging to implement additional systems and services. Commonly teams will
build a Windows Active Directory Domain and so will set up a server as a Windows Active
Directory Domain Controller.
The majority of the blue teams’ effort goes into securing their systems and ensuring their
services work as described in the scenario. If teams have additional time, they may set up an
intrusion detection system on their network. The white team documentation and green team
documentation are generally left to the end of the set up process to write. Teams that have
difficulty securing and running their services commonly do not write this documentation, or
it may be sparse and incomplete. The green team documentation is of great importance, as
it gives instructions to the green team on how to use the blue team’s services. Without this
documentation, the green team may not be able to properly access the blue team’s services
resulting in lost points. Both sets of documentation are also scored.
The white team sets up the venue so that it is ready the day before the competition. Blue
teams then arrive and have a day to finish preparing their systems on the competition network.
At this time the blue teams connect directly to the competition network and are able to test
6their services just like the green team will test them. During this time, volunteers are available
to help blue teams set up their services. Blue teams are allowed to receive help from anyone
before the competition, but once it starts, help is forbidden. Blue teams commonly need help
with their firewall setup as many wait to set the firewall up until this time.
The competition starts at 8 AM. At 8 AM the red team begins to enumerate and attack
the blue teams’ systems. The automated service scanner is started, so teams gain points for
every service that is available. The green team begins usability checks and may start assigning
anomalies at will. At 8:30 the green team and white team documentation are due. Teams
receive score penalties for turning in the documentation late. The white team documentation
is graded by the white team when time is available. The green team documentation is graded
at the end of the competition.
Throughout the competition the red team gains access to the blue teams’ systems. Generally
they are directed to not completely destroy a blue team system until the very end of the
competition. Besides capturing and planting flags, red team members usually make their
presence on the systems known to the blue teams. For example, they may deface the website’s
home page and shut down the web service. Thus, the blue teams are alerted to the fact that
they have been compromised. They must then fix the vulnerability that the red team member
used to break in, fix their website, and then bring the service back online.
Throughout the competition blue teams submit reports every two hours on the malicious
activity they detect and mitigate on their systems. These reports are sent to, and scored by,
the white team.
Blue team members must work together to keep up with all the tasks in the competition.
Every two hours intrusion reports need to be submitted, services need to be kept up and
available, green team usability reports need to be checked and possibly contested, any work
not completed before the competition starts needs to be completed, and green team anomalies
need to be handled as they are given out by the green team.
The competition usually runs until about 3 or 4 PM. At this time, most vulnerable systems
have been compromised by the red team. After some cleanup, the red team debriefs the blue
teams on the vulnerabilities they discovered and possible mitigation steps to prevent or fix
7them.
In order to allow the participants to focus on the event, breakfast and lunch, as well as a
snack bar, are provided. In addition, participants are given t-shirts as both keepsakes and to
identify their team status. Blue shirts are given to the blue team, red ones to the red team,
and green ones to the green team. Throughout the competition, blue team members are not
supposed to talk to either red team or green team members without the permission of the white
team or the green team leader. Each type of team has their own area. The blue teams are
all grouped together. The red team is set apart from the blue teams and are visibly hidden
from them. The green team is put wherever is convenient, usually right next to the blue teams.
The white team is also set apart and has an area where the server systems can be secured. In
addition, this area is set apart so that green, red, and white team members can have discussions
without blue team members overhearing.
1.2 Areas needing enhancement in ISU CDCs
Before beginning the development of CDC in a box for use by others, it was necessary to
review the existing ISU CDCs and determine where they needed to be enhanced. I identified
several areas that needed attention: scoring, the green team, the competition network, and the
competition scenarios.
1.2.1 Problems with scoring
The total team score is made up of several components: uptime checks, intrusion reports,
usability scores, anomaly scores, flags remaining, system documentation, user documentation,
and the red team evaluation. Since the goal of the competition is to protect the flags, or
sensitive data, losing flags or having them planted results in large point loses. Commonly blue
teams that lose flags early on would quit and leave in the middle of the competition. Basically,
they gave up since they didn’t think they could win.
Scoring was done manually using paper and spreadsheets. This made the scoring prone to
human error and involved a lot of work from white team to compile. In addition, teams didn’t
know how they stood in the competition compared to other teams.
8The green team usability scores were done using paper. Blue teams often didn’t know they
had been graded, and many never looked at their usability scores. This meant they lost points
for services that were working, but for whatever reason the green team couldn’t figure out how
to access or use. This commonly occurred since green team members would neglect to read the
documentation they were given by the blue teams.
The uptime scores were determined by an automated system, but it wasn’t designed to
collect uptime information at any specific time. White team members had to check the system
to award points periodically.
The scoring system used was complex due to the use of a multiplier and didn’t work well
with how the green team functioned.
1.2.2 Problems with the green team
Historically the green team members were non-technical spectators that were interested
in the competition[1]. In addition, those interested in helping with the competition that had
either participated in a CDC before as a blue team member or were technically skilled generally
wanted to join the red team. This meant the green team typically had a few technically skilled
members with mostly regular computer users. These users could do simple tasks once shown,
like log into a server and run an application. However, they commonly would neglect to read
the documentation provided by the blue teams, and would not always understand it.
Usability scoring was also plagued by vague requirements, often resulting in green team
members subjectively taking points away because they didn’t like something about the system.
For example, 5 points could be awarded if a system was up and working. They may not like
that a certain feature was disabled, so they would take off 1 point. Another green team member
would not necessarily take a point away for that.
Checking if e-mail was working properly was also difficult. Blue teams were supposed to be
able to send mail between each others mail servers, but that was hard for green team to check,
as they would have needed access to a fully working blue team mail server in order to check
the other blue team mail servers.
Many of the usability checks performed by green team members could be performed by
9automated scripts. For example, going to a website or logging into an FTP server.
Grading anomalies became difficult as well, as only the basic anomalies could be checked
by most of the green team members. The rest had to be checked by the skilled members.
This limited the number of anomalies that could be performed. In addition, it made it almost
impossible to impose time restrictions on anomalies, as they could not be graded right away.
The documentation that the blue team gave the green team was printed. This meant that
the documentation had to be constantly tracked. Also, updates to it had to be scribbled in
by blue team members. Commonly this meant that blue teams lost points since they never
updated vague points of their documentation.
1.2.3 Problems with the competition network
The competition network simulates the real internet. Instead of using private IP ranges
that can be used by anyone connected to the internet via Network Address Translation (NAT),
the competition network uses public IP addresses that are not allocated to ISU and are used
by other organizations on the internet. Thus the competition network is separated from the
internet. A pair of HTTP proxy servers, known as they keyhole, is used to allow systems on
the competition network to access the real internet. These proxy servers connect to each other
via a shared class C private subnet. This is needed to download software or update software.
Commonly blue teams set up their systems by connecting them to the real internet. Once they
are set up, they switch them to the competition network. This creates extra work and problems
for blue teams. Part of the reason blue teams set up on the real internet is so they can access
their systems directly on the network. This allows files to be transferred to/from the systems,
as well as directly testing network services. Once the systems are on the competition network,
they no longer have direct network access to them until they are also on the competition
network. Thus, many teams leave their systems off the competition network during remote set
up and move them to the competition network the day before the competition.
The competition network is supposed to model the real internet. However, the network
configuration used by ISEFlow is hierarchical and fairly flat. In addition, making the network
less flat would be difficult due to a limitation in ISEFlow that only allows each instance of
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ISEFlow to have one outside router. ISEBox is made up of 4 or 5 instances of ISEFlow, so this
limits how the competition network can be designed.
Modifying the competition network layout is difficult. The configuration file used by ISE-
Flow is hard to maintain by hand leading to mistakes due to human error. In addition, few
people understand how it works, so it cannot be changed easily from competition to competition
to support new scenarios.
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CHAPTER 2. ENHANCING ISU CDCS
I explain proposed and implemented enhancements to IScorE, scoring in general, the sce-
nario and flags, the green team, ISEFlow, and remote access to the competition network by
blue teams.
2.1 IScorE
IScorE is a scoring system used during ISU CDCs. It was originally written by a senior
design team and was used for one CDC. It served as a proof-of-concept and allowed us, the
white team (ISEAGE staff) and me, to see how such a system could be used.
The first version took care of most scoring needs by allowing information to be entered
digitally. For example, usability reports were automatically tallied. An automated service
scanner was included as well. While the ability to have all the scores automatically recorded
and summed up was helpful, the system they designed was not flexible. It was custom written
without using a web application development framework. This meant that much of the func-
tionality provided by typical web application development framework had to be implemented
in a custom way, increasing the amount of time it would take someone to learn how the code
works. In addition, the database tables were hard coded to store specific data. This meant
that any changes to how the scoring was done would require both code and database changes.
Every CDC has different elements to it, so IScorE needs to be able to adapt to that. I
proposed to the ISEAGE staff that we use a hierarchy of classes to define score elements. For
example, a master class of documentation would have white team docs and green team docs as
child classes. Score entries would then reference the child class. This allows for several tables
to store many different types of scores. This design is similar to the one that the web based
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online course system Moodle uses to store data. In addition, a general way of building forms
for both content submission (from blue teams) and scoring should be used. For example, the
green team leader could modify the usability check form without having to modify the web
code or database by hand. Besides textual data, the forms should also allow for files to be
attached. Max Peterson, an undergraduate ISU student and ISEAGE employee, implemented
the current version of IScorE using this design.
IScorE greatly improves communication between the various teams by allowing information
to be exchanged digitally. I specified that all green team members should have unique accounts
and that each of the team members names be stored with their filled out usability checks. Thus,
when blue teams had questions about their scores, the green team leader was able to look up
who performed the check, and then talk to the green team member that preformed it.
In addition, IScorE helps the green team leader by allowing anomalies to be entered into
IScorE ahead of time. The anomalies are then released to teams based on a given time.
Anomalies can also be closed at a later time, allowing for anomalies with time limits to be
specified. The name of the green team member that scores an anomaly is also attached to the
score.
A modified version of the service uptime scanner that came with the first version of IScorE
is used in the second version of IScorE. The original service uptime scanner scanned a pre-
determined set of hosts for each blue team and recorded the results in a database. This had
three short comings: 1. The host names, port numbers, and URLs used to check the services
required code changes. They were also the same for each team, preventing variations in blue
team network setups. 2. Adding or removing services from the competition required code
changes. It is common for each competition director to choose different services to be required.
Thus, the services that need to be checked change at every competition. 3. The service checks
were done in serial. So, team 1 would be checked, then team 2, and so on. While this may
work ok if all the services for all teams are up and working properly, it does not work as well
when services are down or slow. A timeout is configured to allow each service time to respond
in case the server is under load. If the timeout is 15 seconds and there are 6 services per team,
it is possible that the service scanner would need 90 seconds to check a team that is completely
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down. If there are 20 teams, then it could take up to 28.5 minutes until the service scanner
scans team 20. Service scans should be performed on a regular interval and should have an
upper bound on the amount of time they take. For example, a scan every 5 minutes would
be reasonable to track uptime during a competition. Thus, the scan needs to run in under 5
minutes. To accomplish this, I modified the service scanner to spawn a thread per team. Thus
the upper bound for the time to scan is determined by the timeout value and the number of
required services. Note that little processing time is required by the service scanner to perform
a check, so the amount of time a check takes is mostly determined by how long it takes the
service to respond to requests from the scanner.
Besides adding threading to the service scanner, I modified the scanner to pull a list of
services from the IScorE database along with unique parameters for each blue team. This list
includes the service type and the necessary information to perform a check. For example, an
HTTP service would include a URL and a port. An SSH check would include a host name or
IP, the port, and a username and password. The results of each service check are then stored
in the database. This allows for services to be added and removed through the IScorE web
interface without requiring code changes in the service scanner. In addition, each blue team
has a unique set of service check information, allowing differences between the various blue
teams’ setups.
2.2 Scoring
The scoring used at the 2011 Community College CDC is given in Table 2.1 below.
Table 2.1 2011 Community College CDC Blue Team Score Allocation
Percent Item
5.71 intrusion reports
5.71 white team documentation
5.71 green team documentation
14.29 red team evaluation
45.72 flags
11.43 service uptime
11.43 green team anomalies
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The green team usability checks were used as a multiplier against the flag score. Each hour
the green team was supposed to perform a usability check. The percentage of points awarded
to the blue team was multiplied by 1/8 and added to the green team usability multiplier. This
was to be done for eight hours. At the end of the competition the value of the green team
usability multiplier was between 0 and 1. This was multiplied by the flag score in order to
determine the final flag score. The purpose behind this system was to balance the usability
of the blue teams’ systems with protection from the red team. For example, blue teams could
take their systems off-line, thus not losing any flags. Their usability multiplier would then be
0, resulting in no points for flags.
While this system sounds reasonable, in practice it did not work well. Attempting to do
a green team usability check every hour is generally not reasonable, as there is not enough
man power on the green team. In addition, the uptime service scanner performs much of
the same function as the green team usability check. The green team usability checks as still
necessary though, as they make sure the systems work properly from a human perspective. The
green team members are able to perform more in depth checks than the automated scanner as
well. However, performing several checks during the competition is enough to gauge the overall
functionality of the blue teams’ systems. If the green team spends too much time on usability
checks, there isn’t any man power left to grade anomalies. Since the service scanner is used
to assign an uptime score to the blue team and keeps track of general service availability, the
green team’s time is better spent working on anomalies rather than completing more than a
few checks during the competition.
I recommended we remove the multiplier and allocate the points in such a way as to make
the red team and green team scores equally important. Thus, if the green team is ignored, the
blue teams suffer huge point losses. If the red team is ignored, the same will be true. The final
score breakdown used at the 2012 NCDC is given in Table 2.2 below.
The overall score breakdown by team is given in Table 2.3 above. Thus any blue team that
wanted to place well in the competition would need to focus heavily on both the green team
and the red team.
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Table 2.2 2012 National CDC Blue Team Score Allocation
Percent Item
5 intrusion reports
5 white team documentation
5 green team documentation
10 red team evaluation
30 flags
15 service uptime
15 green team anomalies
15 green team usability
Table 2.3 2012 National CDC Blue Team Score Allocation by Team
Percent Item
15 automated systems
10 white team
35 green team
40 red team
2.3 Scenario and flags
To better simulate the real world IT environment, I wrote the scenario for the 2012 NCDC as
if it was being written by the CEO of a small company. In order to set up a realistic scenario,
I made up a hacking group that was responsible for compromising the company’s systems.
This group would also continue attacking the systems when they are brought back online. I
introduced several other company employees throughout the scenario to give the blue teams
an idea of who they were. Joe was the old IT admin that was fired. He serves as a possible
disgruntled employee. Chris is the CEO’s son and works with some of the systems. Chris
often makes recommendations to Michael, the CEO. This fact is used later in the anomalies to
request services and changes to the systems that may not be wise.
The other employees can be found in the username and password list along with each
employee’s job title. This allows employees to be given access to services based on their job
roles. For example, the marketing team may need access to the company’s blog, but not the
janitor. It also allows for requests for new services and systems to be sent from these employees
for plausible reasons. For example, the marketing director may ask for mailing list software to
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be set up in order to send out a monthly newsletter.
Providing a realistic scenario based around a made up company with made up employees sets
the stage for requiring blue team members to analyze their systems and classify the importance
of their data. Historically flags were given to each team to place on their servers. These flags
were put in places that required root or administrator access. If an attacker gains root access
to a system, any information on the system is probably lost. However, it is common for systems
to be compromised without the attacker gaining root access. For example, a web server could
be compromised to host malware or a SQL injection could allow a database to be dumped.
In addition, if the attacker learns the credentials of an important person in a company, such
as the CEO or CFO, he or she would have access to sensitive information. In order to better
simulate this type of compromise, I introduced the concept of hidden flags.
Typically flags are PGP encrypted files that hold no actual data that is pertinent to the
company being simulated. A hidden flag is data on a system that acts as a flag. The blue
teams can see and access that data, but they do not know that it will be treated as a flag. The
number of hidden flags is known to the blue teams, but not their actual location.
For the 2012 NCDC, I placed two hidden flags on one system for each blue team. The first
was a file in the CEO’s directory that contained the following made up information
To get info to the board:
https://secure.directorsdesk.com/login.aspx
username: michael.teeth.rule
password:
Each team was given a unique password. Directors Desk is a web site used by company
board members to communicate and schedule meetings. Thus highly sensitive information
would probably be accessible by logging into Michael’s Directors Desk account. There were
several ways for the red team to gain access to this file if the blue teams were negligent. First,
the directory permissions allowed anyone logged into the system to access it. Second, a backup
script was written to back up the system. The backup location was accessible by anyone on the
system. Third, either Michael’s account or the root account could be used to access the data.
So, even if the blue teams managed to keep the red team from gaining root access, that hidden
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flag could still be compromised if they didn’t fix the various directory permission issues.
The second hidden flag was a row in a credit card database. An example is given in Table 2.4
below.
Table 2.4 Example Database Row
Field Name Data
team 1
member id 889-29-4879
name Kevin Koolwin
address One Microsoft Way Redmond, XP, 88918
phone 082-398-1124
cc 8879192837879870
cc expire 12/01/20
cc ccv 8847
dues paid 1
A simple web script was used to retrieve information from the database. By default it
was written to be insecure. The red team could change parameters sent to the web script to
access any data from any database. Blue teams needed to modify the script to only return the
necessary information. In addition, a database administration web application was left wide
open that blue teams would need to secure. So, if the blue teams were negligent, the red team
could capture the hidden flag without needing to gain administrative system access.
Using hidden flags changed the workflow on how blue team systems were prepared. In the
past, a master image was created for each system provided by the white team. This was done
by installing an operating system and some programs onto a computer or a virtual machine. A
copy of the hard disk information is then cloned onto other systems or virtual machines. The
copy that is cloned onto other systems is known as a system image or a disk image. These
images were then given to each blue team. Each system had to have a set of users on them
to simulate real company employees. The account passwords were all the same for each blue
team, and blue teams were not supposed to change them with the exception of the administrator
password. Two changes to this workflow had to be made: 1. Some user accounts needed unique
passwords so that the compromise of one blue team’s username and password list would not
lead to other blue teams losing their hidden flags. 2. A master image could no longer be given
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directly to each team without first modifying it. We first deployed the master image to each
team. We then booted the system, logged in, and assigned new passwords to two users. The
blue teams were also provided with these passwords so they could use them on the systems they
set up from scratch. We then modified the file in Michael’s directory with a unique password.
We also modified a specific row in the credit card database, changing the data in most of the
fields. We then executed commands to cover our tracks and shut the systems down.
In an anonymous survey sent to the NCDC members after the event, 20 out of 21 partici-
pants thought hidden flags should be used in future events. Note that I was not able to filter
out 2 test survey responses as my original survey data was lost in a compromise of the survey
hosting site. I have summarized survey results with totals, but not individual responses.
When asked what they thought about the hidden flags, most members responded positively
or indifferently. However, one member expressed the concern that in a real business the data
to be protected would be known and not hidden. While that assumption is somewhat true, it
is common in the real world for IT workers to determine the value of data based on its content
and use. For example, the database of credit card numbers was a sensitive database, so it
would warrant protection. The data wasn’t hidden from the blue team members, but merely
was not classified as a flag. Changing the term hidden flags to user data flags or some other
term may help to clear up confusion about their intent. The purpose was not to intentionally
hide sensitive data in a place that the blue teams would not expect, for example placing credit
card numbers in /usr/bin, a directory used by Linux systems to hold programs. The purpose
was to make the blue teams look at the data they were protecting in common locations, such
as user home directories and relational databases used for web application, and decide how to
protect it. In addition, the scenario provided listed what the role of each employee account
was for, so the blue teams could ascertain that the CEO might have sensitive data in his home
directory to protect.
Our experience with providing unique info to teams led us to adding the requirement to
IScorE that it should be able to distribute unique data to each team.
Providing a slightly modified master image to each team does have a disadvantage. It would
be possible for two teams to collude to determine what information is unique. For example,
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the diff command, common on Linux and other Unix like systems, can compare all files and
directories between two directories. The only way to work around this would be to provide
completely unique data to each team. However, this is probably not realistic given the amount
of effort that it would take to generate such data. A rule could be added to the competition
that would forbid such collisions between teams.
Overall using hidden flags requires more effort from the competition organizers. The benefit
is that the blue teams must analyze the data present on their systems and ensure that it is
properly secured. This is a more complex task than simply ensuring that the red team cannot
gain administrative access to their systems.
In order to help prevent teams from becoming discouraged and leaving the competition, I
introduced the ability for teams to earn back lost flag points. Each flag was worth 50 points.
If teams could describe how the flag was either stolen or planted, and recommend a way to
mitigate the vulnerability, they could earn back up to 25 points per lost or planted flag. This
gave the blue teams something to do once their flags were compromised. In addition, it rewarded
teams for at least understanding the vulnerabilities present in their systems, even if they didn’t
know how to mitigate them. For teams that lost a flag due to a minor mistake, it allowed them
to demonstrate that they did indeed know what they were doing, and to be rewarded for that
knowledge. Overall the ability to earn back points places emphasis on the need for students
to identify and learn how their systems were compromised by themselves, before the red team
debriefing. Since this concept was used at the NCDC, most teams were highly motivated, so
we weren’t able to see how it affected teams that would have otherwise left early.
2.4 Green team
The number of anomalies and usability checks that the green team can run during a CDC is
directly proportional to the number of technically skilled green team members. Unfortunately,
it is common for there to only be a few such members. Typically people that have participated
in a CDC are able to perform better than those who are new. This is especially true of past
blue team members. I was the green team leader at the CDC for the IT-Olympics. I had
enough skilled members to be able to perform both usability tests and attempt some new time
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limit based anomalies. I also changed how teams perform usability tests.
In the past, at each usability check, a green team member would check the usability of a
different blue team. This had two major problems: 1. Green team members had to spend time
trying to figure out each blue team’s environment by reading the provided documentation. 2.
Green team members would commonly either skip reading the documentation or go through
it too quickly resulting in a poor score for the blue team. The idea behind having each green
team member grade a different blue team each time was to help keep the grading fair, as one
green team member may be more generous with points than another.
I assigned several blue teams to each green team member for the duration of the event.
This allowed each green team member to become familiar with the blue teams’ systems they
were assigned to. If a blue team contested their usability grade, they would work with the
assigned green team member. If the green team member made a mistake, or if the blue team
documentation was incorrect, the green team member noted this for the next usability check.
Points were retroactively awarded if the green team member was at fault. If the blue team
documentation was at fault, no points were awarded. However, the blue team was allowed to
fix the problem resulting in more points for them during the next usability check.
In order to address the fair grading issue, I instructed the green team members to grade
objectively. For example, in the past, a green team member may login to a Windows RDP
server and run OpenOffice Writer. If the green team member didn’t like the RDP environment,
such as if the right mouse click was disabled on the Windows desktop, the member might take
away points. Instead I structured the usability reports to allow only points for objectivity. In
other words, either they could run OpenOffice Writer or they couldn’t. There wasn’t any room
for the green team member to decide how usable the program was, just that it was at a bare
minimum usable. The same sort of objectivity was used for other services. For example, for
e-mail the green team member needed to be able to send an e-mail and receive it.
By assigning blue teams to green team members for the duration of the event and adjusting
the usability reports to be more objective, green team usability checks were performed more
quickly and consistently. The ability for the blue teams to check their scores via IScorE allowed
the blue teams to work with the green team to ensure they were awarded all the points they
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deserved. The extra time the green team members had was used to grade anomalies.
The quality of the blue team documentation given to the green team was graded at the end
of the competition. Green team members were able to give their input based on how useful
and complete they thought the documentation was. This allowed the green team members to
comment on a blue team’s environment once instead of at every usability check. In addition,
the red team evaluates each blue team’s environment and assigns them a score. This score also
takes into account the usability of blue team systems. For example, if a blue team locks down
a system to the point where it is unusable, the red team will not award them as many points.
I introduced time limited anomalies at the IT-Olympics as well. For example, blue teams
would only have 15 minutes to delete or disable an account once notified, or a consultant
account would need to be created within 30 minutes. These anomalies mirrored the real life
requirements of needing to complete specific IT tasks within a tight time window. For example,
it is common for companies to have IT policies that require user accounts to be terminated
immediately after an employee is terminated or quits. An IT emergency might occur with the
need to bring in an outside consultant. Commonly these consultants need accounts created for
them so they can interact with the IT systems. In both of these situations, time is critical. If
the action is not taken quickly, the results could be dire. For example, a terminated employee
could steal company information or attack company systems. If the consultant doesn’t have
an account, he or she may not be able to fix the IT systems.
Having time limited anomalies does pose a logistical challenge for the green team. In order
to process the anomalies as they are submitted, they either need to stop what they are doing or
they need to be idle. In general, performing usability tests takes the most time. If a green team
member has four blue teams to check, it might take him or her up to an hour to complete the
checks. In order to be as fair as possible, the checks should be completed at approximately the
same time. This is because as the competition goes on, the blue team’s systems are commonly
taken down by the red team. The difference of a half an hour could be significant to a blue
team’s usability score. Therefore it is not desirable to stop green team members in the middle
of performing usability checks. The same is true of other anomalies. If blue teams need to set
up a forum on their web server, and that web server is taken down, they will not get points for
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the anomaly. So it is possible that the blue team may complete the anomaly, but 30 minutes
later their web site goes down before the anomaly can be graded. Although blue teams have
requested rescoring of anomalies after bringing services back up, they commonly do not manage
to bring their services back up.
Overall it is important to process anomalies and usability checks as quickly as possible.
Commonly these two checks can be done simultaneously. For example, if the blue teams were
requested to set up a forum on their web server, this could be checked while the green team
member is checking the blue team’s web server. If the green team falls behind on usability
checks and anomaly grading, performing a time limited anomaly would prevent the green team
from catching up. Thus the time limited anomalies have to be released by the green team leader
when there are low points in the green team workload. The green team leader announces the
anomaly to the green team and instructs the members to watch for submissions from the blue
teams. Once a submission is received, the green team immediately checks it. If the submissions
are not checked immediately, then the blue teams could submit the anomaly and then perform
the work once the time limit has expired. So, while time limited anomalies can add some
realism to the simulated IT experience, they can also cause logistical problems for the green
team.
One important aspect that I introduced to the green team usability checks was the persistent
data check. Now that teams are using virtualization systems, it would be easy for them to
snapshot their systems. If the system is attacked and defaced by the red team, the blue team
can simply revert their system back to the state of the snapshot. This sort of action would not
be ok in the real world, as user data would be lost. In order to detect this type of action by
a blue team, I instructed green team members to add data to certain systems during the first
usability check. In subsequent checks, the green team would check to make sure that this data
still exists. If it does not, the blue teams lose usability points.
In addition to the data persistence check, at the NCDC a file restore anomaly was added as
well. As part of the scenario, blue teams were instructed to perform hourly file level backups
of user data. Green team members again created data during their usability checks. The data
is then later deleted by the green team after several hours. The blue teams are then given an
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anomaly requesting this data to be restored. Both data persistence and working backups are
important parts of any IT system.
For the CDCs I also built and secured a green team e-mail server. This was a Scientific
Linux 6 system configured with Postfix, Dovecot, and Roundcube for SMTP, IMAP, and web
based e-mail access respectively. Each blue team was given an account on the system. This
allowed the blue teams to test their e-mail services to make sure they could send and receive
mail from their systems to the green team e-mail server. Before IScorE was used, I also used
this server to contact the teams regarding green team anomalies and other pertinent green
team information. This server both assisted the blue teams in ensuring their e-mail services
were working properly, and gave the green team a reliable way to test them.
2.5 ISEFlow
The operation of ISEBox is easy for anyone with IP networking background to understand
from an abstract level. ISEBox is made up of several virtual machines. Each machine is called a
board. Each board runs one instance of the ISEFlow program which performs IP routing. Each
board contains a set of virtual IP routers with statically defined routes. IP traffic can be routed
between the boards, within the boards, and to IP networks outside of ISEBox. The virtual
routers can be ping’ed (ICMP ECHO). The virtual routers that connect to outside networks
can send and receive Address Resolution Protocol (ARP) requests and responses. This allows
the routers to associate an ethernet MAC address with an IP address on the outside network.
It also allows other devices on the outside network to do the same with the virtual router’s
IP and MAC address. Besides pinging and ARP the virtual routers don’t support any other
network services. Each router has a set of interfaces that is used to receive IP packets from
other routers. Each board can have one outside router that is able to route packets in and out
through a physical ethernet interface. This limitation makes it hard to create networks that
model the internet with a small number of boards.
To overcome that limitation, I modified the ISEFlow code to allow each board to have more
than one outside router. The code itself was mostly ready for this. The modifications can be
summed up in several major steps: 1. Allow more than one outside router to be configured per
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board. 2. Remove the assumption that router 0 is always the outside router. 3. Determine the
correct outside router and pass this information to all necessary function calls.
Configuring ISEBox is harder than simply understanding its operation. The routing tables
for each router require the destination network, the next hop IP, and the next hop board-
/router/interface number to all be defined by hand. For example:
Dest IP, mask, type, next IP, next board, next router, next interface
10.0.4.0, 24, internal, 10.0.1.2, 0, 1, 0
Entering all this information by hand is error prone. It also makes changing the network
configuration hard, as any affected routing table entries must be updated by hand throughout
the entire file. While working on the modifications I made to ISEFlow, I commonly made small
mistakes when modifing the network configuration. At one point I even created a routing loop.
I constantly had to question whether my code modifications were causing bugs or whether
config modifications were causing bugs.
In order to make it easier to modify existing ISEBox configurations, and to allow for simpler
creation of larger ISEBox configurations (more than 10 routers), I wrote simple-isemaker in
Python 2.6. simple-isemaker takes two files as input and outputs a valid ISEBox config file.
The first file is a list of networks in the format:
name, network number, bit mask
Where name is text, network number is an IP network address with no host bits set, and bit
mask is the bit mask applied to the IP network address to define an IP subnet. For example:
a,10.0.1.0,24
The second file is a list of routers in the format:
router, board, outside, neighbor/network pairs
Where router is a positive integer, board is a positive integer, outside is either 0 or 1 for false or
true, and neighbor/network pairs are a list of the router’s neighboring routers and the networks
that interconnect them. For example: 5,2,0,0,c,2,f,6,h,9,g
The program needs to determine how to route an IP packet from any router to any network
subnet in the ISEBox network in order to build each router’s routing table. To do so, the read
in configuration data is used to create a directed graph. The routers are vertices or nodes.
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The adjacency list of neighbors for each router is used to create directed edges. The network
subnets are properties of the nodes. A modified breadth-first search is run once for each router
as a root node. Since breadth-first search determines a path that is of shortest distance from
the root node to each node in the graph[2], this can be used to find a route of shortest distance
to any network in the graph.
Pseudo code for the following modified breadth-first search algorithm can be found in the
appendix. The first step is to mark all nodes and networks as not visited. Next, the networks
that are properties of the root node are marked as visited. An empty list is then allocated for
each neighbor node to keep track of reachable networks that are closest or as close to that node
as any of the other neighbor nodes of the root node. Next, each neighbor node is appended to
a FIFO (first-in, first-out) queue along with the neighbor’s identity. This identity is tracked as
the graph is traversed.
The program then loops by dequeueing a node from the queue until the queue is empty.
With the dequeued node is the identity of the node that is of distance 1 from the root node.
This node is an ancestor of the dequeue node. So it is the node that the root node should
send any packets to that need to reach unvisited networks on unvisited neighbor nodes of the
dequeued node. I shall refer to this node as the first hop ancestor node. Each of the dequeued
node’s neighbors are appended to the queue if they have not been visited before. The first hop
ancestor node is append along with the neighbor nodes. The appended neighbors are marked
as visited. Each of the networks for each neighbor node is checked to see if they have been
visited. If they have not been visited, then the network is added to the list of networks for the
first hop ancestor node. The network is then marked as visited.
Once the loop exits, the modified breadth-first search is complete. Each neighbor node
of the root node now has a set of networks that are closest to it, or of equal distance to it,
than any other neighbor of the root node. The sets are disjoint, so the root node can use this
information to build a routing table. The root node can then use this table to route a packet
to a neighbor that is closest to the destination network.
To build a routing table for each router, this modified breadth-first search is run on each
router. Once this is complete, the necessary steps to generate a usable isemaker config begin.
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Each router is numbered uniquely in the simple config file for the entire ISEBox network, but
each board needs to have a uniquely numbered index of routers starting at 0. Each router is
assigned a unique index number on the board it belongs to. The routers that act as outside
routers are assigned the lowest index numbers, followed by the inside and internal routers.
The interfaces for each router need to be indexed as well. An interface is needed for each
network that the router connects to. The outside interfaces have the lowest index numbers.
Each interface needs to be assigned an IP from the network it connects to. This is accomplished
by assigning an IP from the pool of IPs available in the network. If the interface is an outside
network, then the last IP in the network before the broadcast address is used. For example,
for the outside network 10.1.2.0/24, the address 10.1.2.254 would be allocated. For the outside
interfaces, an ethernet MAC address must be assigned. This is accomplished using a MAC
address generator that is provided with a seed. The MAC addresses are generated in sequential
order from the given seed.
Once the interfaces for each router have been configured, routing tables usable by ISEBox
need to be configured for each router. For each neighbor node, the type of connection to the
neighbor needs to be determined. This is done by checking to see if the neighbor is on the
same board. If it is, it is an internal connection. If not, it is an inside connection. Next, the
interface that the neighbor router uses to communicate with the current router is looked up
using the network identity given with the neighbor in the network configuration file. For the
neighbor, the set of networks closest to it are enumerated. A routing table entry is made for
each network using the network number and bit mask along with the interface information
previously determined.
The ISEMaker configuration file is now complete. Since simple-isemaker is designed for
common network scenarios, it makes assumptions about how the network is structured and
how much information the user needs to provide. In order to write simple config files for
simple-isemaker, the user is not required to allocate IP addresses for each interface used by
each router. MAC addresses need not be specified for outside interfaces either. This may not
be desirable in all situations, but in order to support specifying this type of information, the
size and complexity of the simple-isemaker config files would increase.
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In addition, several assumptions are made about the network structure. First, it is assumed
that any outside network is present on only one router. Second, it is assumed that a router can
communicate with its neighbors symmetrically over the same network. So, if router 1 connects
to router 2 via network A, it is assumed that router 2 connects to router 1 via network A as
well. Third, network IP ranges do not overlap. These assumptions are checked during the
configuration file generation. If any are violated, the program quits with an error.
The program makes use of the IP Address Manipulation Library for the Python Standard
Library. This library was recently developed and made a part of the Python standards[3].
Although it is not part of Python 2.6 yet, the reference implementation is available. I used this
library to store, manipulate, and validate IP addresses and network specifications. Thus, any
error in specifying the network number for a network in the networks config file will be caught
and reported to the user. In addition, I used this library to find the last usable IP address in
a network before the broadcast address and to enumerate through IP addresses in a network.
It is also used to perform the checks to ensure that networks do not overlap.
Overall, simple-isemaker allows for two simple configuration files to be used to generate the
more complex ISEBox configuration file. This will hopefully allow anyone who is familiar with
IP network design to create an ISEBox network configuration quickly and easily. All of the
configuration input is validated and checked for errors which reduces problems caused by human
error. In addition, many of the opportunities for human error in an ISEBox file are removed
since much of the generated config file is made automatically. For example, indexing routers,
interfaces, and referencing those indexes in routing tables. This will also make modifying the
network configuration easier, as fewer edits will need to be made by hand. In addition, due to
the error checking, many simple errors made while modifying the network configuration will be
caught by the program.
2.6 Remote access to the competition network
It would be useful for teams to be able to access their systems on the competition network.
Currently, the team must either use the virtualization system management client or be con-
nected directly to the competition network. It would be desirable to allow teams to connect
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directly to their systems to manage them and to test them. I’ve found three solutions to allow
teams to connect to the competition network remotely from the real internet. 1. Use proxy
servers 2. Use a VPN 3. Set up a Twice NAT for services
2.6.1 Proxy servers
They keyhole is used to connect the ISEBox network to the real internet. It is made up
of two HTTP proxy servers. Client requests from the competition network are sent to keyhole
1. Keyhole 1 then forwards the request to keyhole 2 over a private IP range. Keyhole 2 then
performs any necessary DNS lookups and sends the request to the intended destination. Any
replies are sent back to keyhole 1, and then to the client. The Squid HTTP proxy server is
used. It supports HTTP proxying and the HTTP CONNECT method proxying. With HTTP
proxying, the data sent between the client and the server are in clear text. The data can
be modified by the proxy server. Only the HTTP protocol can be used through the proxies
in this manner. HTTP CONNECT is provided to support HTTP over SSL, which prevents
man-in-the-middle attacks, so the proxy server cannot modify the data. The proxy server must
pass the data between the client and the server unmodified. Besides being used for HTTPS,
many client applications can use the HTTP CONNECT method to access services through a
proxy. Two examples are SSH and FTP. In order to allow remote access to the competition
network, the keyhole could be designed to work in both directions. A username and password
could be required to access the proxy server on keyhole 2 in order to send requests to the
competition network. Unfortunately, Microsoft’s remote desktop protocol (RDP) does not
support connections through an HTTP proxy using the HTTP connect method. However, this
would allow access for services such as e-mail, FTP, SSH, and web.
2.6.2 VPN
A Virtual Private Network (VPN) can be used to allow teams to connect to the competition
network remotely by carefully choosing the competition IP ranges and modifying the routing
table on the client system. In order for teams to access the competition network, routes for
each blue team network could be added to the client’s routing table. These routes would direct
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traffic destined for those networks through a VPN connection that would terminate within the
competition network. To allow the teams to continue to use their internet connection normally,
only the networks that are assigned to the blue teams should be routed through the VPN.
Although the real internet and the competition network IP ranges overlap, typically internet
users do not need to connect to other internet users. So, in order to prevent the overlap from
causing a problem, IP address ranges could be chosen from ISPs around the world that provide
internet service to consumers. Thus statically routing traffic from these ranges on the real
internet to the competition network shouldn’t interrupt the user’s normal internet use.
PPTP VPN clients are built into most consumer operating systems. However, they do
not provide a good way to specify a large number of static routes to be pushed to the client.
OpenVPN does provide such functionality, but it would need to be installed by users on their
computers. This may be problematic for users that do not control the computer they use. For
example, when a student is using a computer in a school computer lab. However, most students
participating in a CDC do have their own computer, so this would be a reasonable approach.
An OpenVPN client configuration file and a self signed certificate would need to be given
to each team member. The configuration file contains all the information needed to connect to
the VPN. Once the client connects, the static routes are pushed to the client. The VPN server
gives out private IPs via DHCP. The VPN clients are then NAT’ed behind an IP on the VPN
server. The VPN server would be on the real internet, but would also be connected to the
ISEBox network. In order to route traffic to the ISEBox network, a static route would need
to be created for each network that should be reachable through the VPN. These static routes
would all point to the same router that would be present on the ISEBox network.
For teams that set up a firewall to protect their networks, they could also set up a VPN
to allow access to their internal network. I was able to successfully use a client on the real
internet to connect to the ISEBox network via a VPN. I then created another VPN connection
through the first in order to connect to a network protected by a firewall.
Note that although I specified that a NAT should be used for the VPN clients when accessing
the competition network, it is not necessary. The VPN clients could be assigned IPs on the
competition network itself. However, this would allow any system within the network to access
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the VPN client’s system. This is probably not desirable.
Although this setup would require educating the blue team members and would require
more setup and maintenance for the white team, it would provide an effective way to allow
teams to directly access systems on the competition network. The one major problem would be
selecting IP ranges for the competition network and the private IP range for the VPN clients
such that no blue team member would have problems with legitimate internet traffic being
redirected through the VPN. Given the large number of IP addresses available that do not host
internet services, I think this problem can be overcome with careful planning.
2.6.3 Twice NAT
Typically NAT is used to allow the use of private IP addresses to connect to the internet. A
client with a private IP sends a request that is routed through a device that has both a private
and public IP. The device rewrites the IP header information to make the request appear to
come from its public IP. The request is then sent to the destination. Any replies are sent back
to the client system after changing the IP from the device’s public IP to that of the client.
To use NAT to allow for remote access to services on the competition network, the NAT
must be performed in both directions. According to RFC 2663, this is known as Twice NAT[4].
First, a port is opened on a system connected to the internet. Client requests are sent to
the system on this port. This system then forwards the request to an IP and port on the
competition network which is the true destination of the client request. It changes the source
of the IP packet from the client’s IP address to its own IP address that is used to send traffic
to a competition network router. It then changes the destination IP address and port number
to that of the service on the internal network. Once a reply destined for the client is received,
it reverses this process.
I successfully tested this setup using the FreeBSD Packet Filter (PF) to perform the NATs.
The configuration file I used can be found in the appendix. In order for blue teams to use
this setup to access their systems, a NAT would need to be created for each one of their
services. In addition, since these services would be exposed to the internet, the blue team
should probably be required to provide their client IP addresses that would be accessing the
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NAT. This would prevent malicious people on the internet from finding the vulnerable CDC
systems and exploiting them. The setup would either have to be created by hand, or optimally,
through a system where blue team members could request access and the NAT rule would be
created automatically.
The Twice NAT setup could also be used to create jump points within the competition
network. For example, a Windows system running RDP or a Linux system running SSH could
be placed on the competition network. Blue team members would then connect to these systems
via a Twice NAT. From there, they would be able to jump to other systems via RDP or SSH.
In addition, SSH can be used to forward ports between the client and the server. The blue
team members could use this functionality to directly connect to their services.
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CHAPTER 3. ISEBox on KVM
In order to provide a CDC in a box to other institutions, it is necessary to pick and assemble
the software that will form the base of CDC in a box. I chose to use Linux and the Kernel-based
Virtual Machine (KVM) virtualization environment to form this base.
RedHat Entperise Linux (RHEL) 6 supports KVM as the primary virtualization environ-
ment. Although a license must be purchased to use RHEL, there are free versions of RHEL that
are built using the source code that is given out by RedHat to build RHEL. RedHat is required
to give out this source code as their software is licensed under the GNU Public License (GPL).
Two such free Linux distributions are CentOS and Scientific Linux. Therefore users of the CDC
in a box can either purchase support for the deployment of the virtualization infrastructure or
they can use a free community supported version. I used CentOS for development and testing.
I was given a document entitled ”ISEMaker” along with the ISEFlow code. ISEMaker
contained instructions to set up ISEBox on VMware Server. At the time, VMware Server
had just been retired by VMware, so a new virtualization environment needed to be chosen.
VMWare had several replacement products, such as VMware Workstation, VMware Player,
and VMware ESXi. Each of these products had advantages and disadvantages when compared
with KVM. VMware workstation requires a license to be purchased. In addition, it is not
designed to run virtual machines for long periods of time acting as servers; it is primary used
for development. VMware Player is similar to VMware workstation, but it is free. It has
less features that workstation. VMware ESXi is VMware’s flagship virtualization environment.
Unlike VMware workstation and player, which are installed on top of an existing operating
system such as Windows, ESXi runs directly on top of the system hardware. This means that
a system has to be dedicated to running just ESXi. In addition, this system could not be used
by the ESXi operator to maintain the ESXi environment. A separate client package must be
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installed in Windows to perform the administrative operations. Due to ESXi running directly
on hardware, the range of hardware it supports is limited, so not all existing systems will be
compatible with ESXi. The basic version of ESXi is free. However, to gain more advanced
capabilities such as the ability to script the ESXi environment, a license must be purchased
from VMware[5].
KVM runs on top of the Linux kernel. This means that any hardware that Linux supports,
KVM will support. The only exception is processors. Processors must have virtualization
instructions built into them in order to utilize KVM. These extensions are Intel VT-x or AMD-
V. Both are found in most modern processors. Any server class system will have them, and
most consumer class systems have them as well. Some of Intel’s cheapest processors do not
have the Intel VT-x extension. These are found commonly in budget laptops.
KVM is easy to install on a RHEL or CentOS system. Once installed, there is a GUI based
administrative interface called Virtual Machine Manager (VMM). There is also a command line
utility called virsh. The VMM is an X Windows based application and can be run remotely
via X Forwarding. Since virsh is a command line application, it can be used over SSH. This
allows for the environment to be remotely administered. In addition, virsh can be used in shell
scripts in order to automate the configuration and operation of KVM.
I replaced most of the documentation in the ISEMaker document to be KVM specific. I also
added details about how to set up each system needed for ISEBox. To update the document
I added details on how to install RHEL or CentOS and prepare the KVM environment. Next
I prepared documentation and scripts to set up ISEBox. ISEBox is made up of the following
systems: 5 Boards, 3 FreeBSD test systems, 2 FreeBSD systems for the keyhole, 1 FreeBSD
system to control the boards named snowflake, 1 pfSense firewall, and 3 Windows systems. The
documentation details the steps to set up each system. Previously only the set up of snowflake
and boards 1-5 were somewhat explained. Scripts and XML configuration files are included to
configure most of the KVM setup automatically.
The configuration for KVM is stored by KVM in XML files. These files can be exported to
save the configuration information. For example, each virtual network has an XML configura-
tion file, and each virtual machine has an XML configuration file. The exported files can be
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modified and used to configure or reconfigure KVM.
To begin the set up process, the user must create a storage pool to store operating system
installation disk images. The user must also create the bridged interface that will be used to
connect ISEBox to the internet. Once these steps are complete, a network configuration shell
script is run to configure the virtual networks. This script uses network XML configuration
files to create each network work, to start it, and to set it to autostart upon system bootup.
Next, the user can modify the virtual hard disk storage pool location if the default location
used by KVM is not acceptable. The user then runs a script to auto create the virtual disks
used by the initial VMs that need to be configured. Next, the user runs a script to create the
initial VMs. At this point, the user must configure snowflake by hand. This involves following
the given instructions to set up FreeBSD and build the ISEFlow code. Next, the user follows
the instructions to set up board 1. The user then shuts down board 1 and uses a script to
clone board 1 to boards 2-5. The user then must boot up each board and follow the given
instructions to make each board unique. At this point ISEFlow can be configured and started.
Keyhole 1 and 2 are then created. The keyhole systems run the Squid HTTP proxy software
to allow the systems on the ISEBox network to access web sites on the real internet. Keyhole
2 is set up first by the user. Next, keyhole 2 is cloned to create keyhole 1. The user must then
make minor modifications to the cloned keyhole 1. The NAT-FW system is set up following
the given instructions at this time. Finally, the Windows and FreeBSD test systems can be
created however the user wishes. These can be cloned as well once an initial test system is
created.
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CHAPTER 4. SUMMARY AND FUTURE WORK
4.1 Summary
I have described various enhancements that can be applied to the CDCs hosted by ISU
to improve their operation. IScorE’s integration into the CDCs is a major improvement in
score accuracy, communication between the blue teams and the white/red/green teams, and
time spent tabulating scores. The scoring itself has been refactored to balance the blue teams’
requirements to both secure their systems while maintaining usable systems. Hidden flags
have been introduced which better approximate the type of data normally found on typical IT
systems. Blue teams must analyze the data on their systems in order to protect the hidden
flags. The ability to earn back points from lost or planted flags gives the blue teams the role
of a typical IT team that has had a system compromised. They must learn what happened,
how it happened, how to fix it, and how to prevent it from happening again. Hopefully this
will lead students to learn how their systems were compromised instead of waiting for the
red team debriefing or simply giving up and going home. Modifications have been made to
ISEFlow to allow it to better model the structure of the internet with only a few boards. In
addition, simple-isemaker allows anyone with IP networking background to be able to configure
a network for ISEBox. Each of the remote access solutions presented would allow blue teams
to have direct access to their systems on the competition network, allowing them to set up and
test their systems more efficiently. The ISEBox on KVM set up documentation and scripts
provide the necessary information for anyone to set up their own ISEBox even if they are not
familiar with virtualization technology or ISEFlow. This work forms the basis for future work
on the CDC in a box project.
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4.2 Future work
In order to work on the requirements for the CDC in a box, I needed to participate in mul-
tiple CDCs as a blue team member and as a white and green team member. These experiences
taught me that running a successful CDC requires many experienced people all doing their
respective jobs. I focused much of my research on how the green team should function in order
to positively affect the competition. After enhancing the green team and other elements of the
competition, I think it is ready to be shown to other institutions. The following steps should be
completed in order to complete the CDC in a box project. 1. A simple-isemaker config should
be written to model the real world wide internet topology. This could be accomplished with
around 40 routers. I began work on modifying ISEFlow and creating simple-isemaker with the
goal of being able to make such a network configuration. 2. The KVM based ISEBox and
newly made ISEBox network configuration should be tested and then used at an ISU CDC. 3.
One or more of the remote access options presented should be implemented and used for an
ISU CDC. 4. If all the testing goes well, the support systems needed to run the CDC should be
implemented on top of KVM along with the ISEBox systems. 5. The amount of configurability
that a potential user of the CDC in a box would need should be determined. Based on that, the
ISEBox systems and support systems should be templated to allow the necessary configuration
changes to be made via shell scripts. Optionally, another type of interface could be used to
make the changes such as a web interface. 6. A downloadable copy of the ISEBox and support
systems would need to be provided, as well as the necessary documentation needed to setup
KVM. Scripts should be provided to install and configure the systems that make up the CDC
in a box. The existing ISEMaker guide and support scripts would form the basis for this. 7.
Guides need to be written by experienced participants of the CDCs. A guide would be needed
for each of the white, green, red, and blue teams. In addition, a general overview document
would need to be written. 8. Example scenarios and anomalies should be collected and made
available. 9. Additional ideas for scenarios and anomalies should be provided.
Once these steps are completed, the CDC in a box would be ready for use by other higher
learning institutions.
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APPENDIX
An example configuration file that creates a Twice NAT on a FreeBSD system is provided
as well as psuedo code for the modified breadth-first search algorithm.
FreeBSD example PF configuration file for Twice NAT
The following file (/etc/pf.conf) is taken from a working FreeBSD based Twice NAT setup.
Comments are provided to explain each line of the file. Comment lines begin with the #
character. Documentation for the PF can be found online[6].
# hosts on this interface don’t have a route to the int_if
ext_if = "em0"
# hosts on this interface use this as their default gw
int_if = "em1"
# hosts on int_if
lan_net = "199.100.16.0/24"
# don’t filter the loopback interface
set skip on lo0
# all connections to the IP on the ext_if to be redirected (port forwarded) to
# the IP on the internal network (not this machine) on from port 1022 to 1099
rdr pass on $ext_if proto tcp from any to 192.168.24.100 port 1022 -> \
199.100.16.95 port 1099
# for testing purposes, if allowed, the internal interface hosts can access
# the external interface hosts via nat
nat on $ext_if from $int_if:network to any -> ($ext_if)
# NAT rule from the external interface to the internal interface to the IP
# running the desired service, the port is forwarded by the rdr rule, this rule
# provides the NAT, this machine will appear to be the source IP, even though
# it is not
nat on $int_if from $ext_if:network to 199.100.16.95 port 1099 -> ($int_if)
# default rules to block all traffic, note that the rdr rules with pass are
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# not affected
block in all
block out all
# only allow traffic destined for IPs on this host, that should prevent
# traffic from being routed through this system
pass in on $int_if from any to 199.100.16.100
pass in on $ext_if from any to 192.168.24.100
# allow any traffic out, as the in rules limit what will be routed
pass out on $int_if to $lan_net
pass out on $ext_if to any
Modified breadth-first search psuedo code
The following pseudo code is written using the Python programming style and language
syntax.
for node in r o u t e r s :
node . v i s i t e d = False
for network in networks :
network . v i s i t e d = False
for rootNode in r o u t e r s :
rootNode . v i s i t e d = True
for network in r o u t e r s . network :
network . v i s i t e d = True
for neighbor in rootNode . ne ighbors :
ne ighbor . v i s i t e d = True
for network in neighbor . networks :
i f network . v i s i t e d == False
rootNode . nextHop [ ne ighbor ] . add ( network )
network . v i s i t e d = True
queue . append ( ( neighbor , ne ighbor ) )
while l ength ( queue ) != 0 :
( node , ance s to r ) = queue . dequeue ( )
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for neighbor in node . ne ighbors :
i f neighbor . v i s i t e d == False :
queue . append ( ( neighbor , ance s to r ) )
ne ighbor . v i s i t e d = True
for network in neighbor . networks :
i f network . v i s i t e d == False
rootNode . nextHop [ ne ighbor ] . add ( network )
network . v i s i t e d = True
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